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RACE, CLASS, AND THE OBAMA TAx PLAN
DOROTHY A. BROWNt
ABSTRACT
This Essay examines three areas of federal tax policy: (i) the exclu-
sion for employer provided pensions; (ii) the mortgage interest deduc-
tion; and (iii) the earned income tax credit for the working poor. Each of
the three areas is addressed in The Obama Tax Plan. My previous re-
search showed that in those three areas, low-income taxpayers were dis-
advantaged when compared with higher income taxpayers, and taxpayers
of color were disadvantaged when compared with white taxpayers. This
Essay shows that The Obama Tax Plan's provisions would be good for
low-income taxpayers and taxpayers of color. This Essay also briefly
discusses political pitfalls inherent in enacting each of the Obama Tax
Plan provisions discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
This has been an historic political season. Senator Obama was the
first African-American of a major party to run for President.' Even more
importantly, Senator Obama has become the first African-American
President of the United States2 after running a brilliant campaign. 3 At a
symposium addressing the Obama Phenomenon, it may be reasonable to
ask the question: what does tax have to do with all this?
I have spent over a decade studying the race and class implications
of federal tax policy. 4 I thought it would be interesting to see if the tax
t Professor of Law Emory Law School, B.S., Fordham University; J.D., Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center; L.L.M. (Taxation), New York University. I would like to thank the participants
at the Obama Phenomenon Symposium at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law in August
2008. I thank Mr. Andrew Boardman for excellent research assistance. I would also like to thank
Mr. Will Haines for his flawless library research assistance. The financial support of Emory Law
School and the Race and Difference Initiative at Emory University is gratefully acknowledged.
Dorothy.Brown@emory.edu, Copyright 2008.
1. See e.g., John Harwood, History Suggests McCain Faces an Uphill Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2008, at A16 ("Mr. Obama has already made history as the first African-American to be-
come a major-party nominee for president.").
2. See e.g., Peter Baker, Whose President Is He Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at
WKI ("As the first African-American president in a nation long divided over race, Mr. Obama will
face crosscurrents that none of his predecessors ever did .... ").
3. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Obama's Car Puzzle, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2008, at A17
("[Obama] ran a brilliant campaign .. "); Editorial, Election Brings Change to America,
CtNCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 5, 2008, at 8B ("The brilliant, nearly flawless campaign of Barack
Obama was more than just the compelling oratory of a gifted politician.").
4. See, Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 790,
790 (2007) (discussing the earned income tax credit) [hereinafter Race and Class Matters]; Dorothy
A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755, 756 (2005)
(comparing the earned income tax credit and the child tax credit) [hereinafter Tax Treatment]; Doro-
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policies of the first African-American President would benefit taxpayers
of color as well as low-income white taxpayers. My preliminary conclu-
sion is that the specific provisions of the Obama Tax Plan discussed in
this Essay, if enacted, will significantly benefit taxpayers of color as well
as low-income white taxpayers.
Part II will describe my current and previous research in three dis-
crete areas of federal tax law: employer provided pensions; 5 mortgage
interest deduction;6 and the earned income tax credit.7 It will show that
current tax policies significantly disadvantage low-income taxpayers
regardless of race as well as middle-income black and Latino taxpayers.8
Part II will describe the Obama Tax Plan in those three areas. It
describes the proposal to require employer provided pension plans to
have as their default rule that employees opt in. Employees would have
to affirmatively opt out of the plan if they did not want to participate. It
then describes the proposed tax credit for homeownership which would
benefit homeowners who currently do not receive any tax benefits. Fi-
nally, it describes the proposals to expand tax credits for the working
poor by expanding the earned income tax credit as well as creating a new
refundable tax credit.
Part IV then shows how the Obama Tax Plan would greatly benefit
taxpayers of color as well as low-income white taxpayers. Part V de-
scribes the political vulnerabilities of the Obana Tax Plan.9 This Essay
concludes by noting that the Bush tax cuts are set to expire in 2010,
thy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1469, 1479 (1997) (discussing the marriage penalty and marriage bonus); Dorothy A.
Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv 1501, 1514 (2004) (discussing employer
provided pensions) [hereinafter Pensions]; Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk Aversion: The
Influence of Race, Ethnicity, and Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 385, 386
(2007) (discussing employer provided pensions) [hereinafter Risk Aversion]; see generally, Dorothy
A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B.
Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, eds., 1996); Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the Twenty-First
Century: What's Tax Policy Got to Do With It, 21 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 759 (1999);
Dorothy A. Brown, Social Security and Marriage in Black and White, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 111 (2004);
Dorothy A. Brown, Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Social Security Reform: Risks,
Returns, and Race, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633 (2000); Dorothy A. Brown, Split Personali-
ties: Tax Law and Critical Race Theory, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 89 (1997); Dorothy A. Brown,
The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative Issues in Black and White, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM.
RTS. 287 (1999).
5. See Pensions, supra note 4, at 1501; Risk Aversion, supra note 4, at 385.
6. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
7. See Race and Class Matters, supra note 4, at 790; Tax Treatment, supra note 4, at 756.
8. My research which is largely based on empirical data is limited to African-Americans and
Latinas/os, primarily because of the difficulty of obtaining data on Asian-Americans and American
Indians due to their limited sample size in the studies that I have seen.
9. See, e.g., Newt Gingrich & Peter Ferrara, Let's Have a Real Middle-Class Tax Cut, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 20, 2008, at A19 ("For the bottom 40% of income earners, who pay no federal income
taxes on net today, these refundable income tax credits will not reduce tax liability but instead result
in new checks from the federal government for the targeted social purposes. That's not a tax cut. It's
welfare.")
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which makes it extremely likely that tax reform will occur. What the
final Obama Tax Plan will consist of is anybody's guess. If, however,
the Obama Tax Plan includes the provisions discussed herein, economic
justice issues, which have largely been excluded from tax policy dis-
course, will be front and center this time around-and that's a good
thing.' °
II. RACE, CLASS, AND THE TAX CODE
This Part describes my current and previous research in three areas
of federal tax policy: (i) employer provided pension plans; (ii) the mort-
gage interest deduction; and (iii) the earned income tax credit. To pro-
vide some context, for fiscal year 2009, the projected revenue loss from
employer provided pension plans is $124.8 billion, l and the projected
revenue loss from the mortgage interest deduction is $99.4 billion.1
2
A. Employer Provided Pension Plans
13
There are significant tax benefits associated with employer provided
pensions. First, amounts set aside by employers are tax deductible.
1 4
Second, employees get to exclude such amounts from their current in-
come. i5 Third, the income that accumulates on such amounts will accu-
mulate tax free.' 6 Fourth, the employee is only taxed when she with-
draws such amounts.'
7
Not every employee has access to an employer provided pension
plan. In 2005, almost sixty percent of employees worked for employers
with pension plans, yet only slightly more than half participated in those
plans.18 In addition, there are race and class effects of such participation.
Whitel workers were more likely to participate than workers of col-
or, and higher income employees were more likely to participate than
lower income workers.' 9 Only white workers had a majority participat-
ing in employer provided pension plans, followed by slightly less than
half for Asian, Native American, and black workers with Latino workers
10. Cf. Richard A. Booth, Five Decades of Corporation Law: From Conglomeration to Equity
Compensation, 53 VILL. L. REv. 459, 471 (2008) ("As Martha Stewart would say, that is a good
thing.").
11. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005-2009, JCS-1-05 38 (2005).
12. Id. at 33.
13. This section draws significantly from my prior work in this area. See Pensions, supra
note 4; Risk Aversion, supra note 4.




18. Id. at 390.
19. Id. ("In 2005, 57.3% of white employees participated in the plan, followed by 48.8% of
Asian and Native American workers, 46.5% of black workers, and 29% of Hispanic workers.").
2009]
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significantly behind with only twenty-five percent participation rates.2°
No racial or ethnic minority group has a majority of its members partici-
pating in employer provided pensions.
Seventy percent of workers earning more than $60,000 participated
in their employers' pension plans, while only twenty-seven percent of
workers earning less than $25,000 participated. 2' Therefore, the tax ben-
efits go disproportionately to higher income employees and to white em-
ployees.
Behavioral research has shown however that default rules can play a
key role in whether employees who are eligible to participate in employ-
er provided pensions actually participate.2 For example, default rules
that require employees to opt out of, instead of opting into pension plans,
make it far more likely that employees will participate in their employer
provided plans.23
B. The Mortgage Interest Deduction
24
There are significant tax benefits for homeownership. Homeown-
ers, who itemize their deductions, can deduct their mortgage interest
payments on up to two personal residences from income in calculating
their tax liability.25 In addition, the rental value of the personal residence
is excluded from income.26 The receipt of those tax benefits also has a
race and class effect.
Whites are more likely to be homeowners and eligible for homeow-
nership tax benefits than blacks, Latinos, or Asians. 27 Seventy-six per-
cent of whites are homeowners, while sixty-one percent of Asians, forty-
nine percent of Latinos, and forty-eight percent of blacks are homeown-
ers. 28 While the majority of whites and Asians are eligible for housing
tax breaks, the majority of Latinos and blacks are not. Whites, because
they are the most likely to be homeowners, are more likely to be eligible
for the tax benefits associated with homeownership, followed by a ma-
jority of Asians as well. The majority of Latinos and blacks are ineligi-
ble for tax breaks, because the majority of Latinos and blacks are renters,
not homeowners.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 391 ("In 2005, the percentage of workers who actually participated in their pension
plan was 70.3% (>$60,000), 61.5% ($38,000-60,000), 49.8% ($25,000-38,000), and 27.5%
(<$25,000).").
22. See id. at 404.
23. Id.
24. This section draws significantly from an article that I'm working on. See Brown, supra
note 6.
25. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2007). The interest deduction is only allowed on mortgages up to $1
million and an additional $100,000 on home equity loans.
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Only fifty-four percent of homeowners receive a tax benefit from
the mortgage interest deduction.29 Only two percent of taxpayers who
are homeowners with income up to $15,000 receive a tax benefit, while
ninety percent of taxpayers who are homeowners with income at least
$75,000 receive a tax benefit. Ninety-seven percent of taxpayers who
are homeowners with income over $1 million receive a tax benefit. Tax
benefits associated with homeownership disproportionately go to higher
income taxpayers.
C. The Earned Income Tax Credit30
There are significant benefits available under the earned income tax
credit ("EITC") for the working poor. The EITC is a refundable credit
which means the credit can be for an amount greater than the taxpayer's
tax liability. 3 For 2009, a family with at least two children can receive
up to $5,028, and the EITC is completely phased out for those house-
holds earning just under $44,000. 2 In many instances, without the
EITC, families would live below the poverty line.33 The complexity of
the E1TC, is however, well documented.34
The EITC benefits for families with children are significantly great-
er than for childless households, and the E1TC benefit for households
with two or more children are greater than the E1TC benefit for house-
holds with one child. 5 Yet when compared with the Child Tax Credit
("CTC"), which was enacted as a middle class tax cut 36 and increases
with every child in the household, 7 the E1TC is found lacking.
The CTC was enacted to respond to the reduced ability to pay taxes
as family size increases with additional children.38 The EITC on the oth-
er hand was originally enacted to not increase as family size increased
with additional children so as to ensure that such families were not being
financially rewarded for having additional children.
39
29. Id.
30. This section draws significantly from two articles that I've written on the earned income
tax credit: Race and Class Matters, supra note 4; Tax Treatment, supra note 4.
31. Tax Treatment, supra note 4, at 766.
32. James C. Young, A Summary of 2009 Inflation Adjustments Affecting Individuals, 121
TAx NOTES 439 (2008).
33. Tax Treatment, supra note 4, at 766.
34. Id. at 767.
35. Id. at 770-71.
36. Id. at 782-83.
37. Id. at 788-89.
38. Id. at 783.
39. Id. at 767. The Senate Finance Committee did not want to increase the EITC for each
additional child out of concern of providing an "economic incentive for having additional child-
ren[.]" Idat 767 n.41.
20091
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Recipients of the EITC have been referred to as receiving "wel-
fare." 4 The argument is that EITC payments can be in excess of the
taxpayer's income tax liability and such amounts are "welfare." What
that argument ignores is the primary function of the EITC is to offset
federal taxes associated with working, which includes income taxes and
social security or payroll taxes.41 The EITC was designed to encourage
work and offset the costs associated with work that are not associated
with welfare, where the benefits are received tax-free.
In addition, the EITC has been assumed by academics-with no
empirical basis-to disproportionately benefit blacks.42  Perhaps they
assumed that since blacks represent a higher percentage of the population
in poverty than their overall numbers in the population, that would
mandate that the black working poor would represent a higher percentage
of the overall EITC-eligible population than their numbers in the overall
population. Yet none of the academics who stated blacks disproportio-
nately benefit from the EITC had any data on the racial composition of
the EITC-eligible population.43
Over half of all EITC eligible taxpayers are white, slightly less than
twenty-five percent of all EITC eligible taxpayers are black, and slightly
less than eighteen percent of all EITC eligible taxpayers are Latino.
44
One comparison could be the EJTC-eligible population and the popula-
tion in poverty. In 2007, 8.2 percent of non-Hispanic whites, 10.2 per-
cent of Asians, 21.5 percent of Hispanics, and 24.5 percent of blacks,
were living in poverty.45 Under that comparison we would see that
whites disproportionately benefit from the EITC and blacks are eligible
for the E1TC in a percentage similar to their overall poverty rate. As I've
written elsewhere, poverty is a weak proxy for the E1TC.46 What is sig-
nificant to remember, however, is that academics writing about the EITC
perceive it to disproportionately benefit blacks.
40. Race and Class Matters, supra note 4, at 802, 805; Tax Treatment, supra note 4, at 796-
801.
41. Race and Class Matters, supra note 4, at 817.
42. Tax Treatment, supra note 4, at 801-05.
43. Id. at 802-04.
44. Race and Class Matters, supra note 4, at 821.
45. United States Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division,
http://www.census.govlhhes/www/poverty/povertyO7/povO7hi.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009); cf.,
Symposium, Panel Two: Who's Minding the Baby, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 918 (2000) ("[Tihe rate
of poverty remains at twenty-five percent in the black community while it is under ten percent for
whites .... ); Hermon George, Jr., Community Development and the Politics of Deracialization:
The Case of Denver, Colorado, 1991-2003, 594 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI 143, 146
(2004) ("In 2000, the national black poverty rate (all persons) was 22.1 percent, 2.35 times the white
rate.").
46. Tax Treatment, supra note 4, at 826 ("Poverty, therefore, is a weak proxy for EITC-
eligibility.").
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Ill. THE OBAMA TAX PLAN
During the recent presidential election, Senator Obama (now Presi-
dent Obama) ran with numerous tax policy proposals. I have referred to
them as the Obama Tax Plan. This section will examine three different
individual tax proposals put forth by the Obama campaign, and for ease
of analysis, I rely on the description provided by the Tax Policy Center.47
Those proposals are: (i) mandatory default rules for employer-provided
pensions; (ii) refundable credit for mortgage interest; and (iii) refundable
credits for low-income workers.
A. Employer-Provided Pensions-Default Rules
The Obama Tax Plan includes automatic enrollment in employer-
provided pension plans.48 This would require employees to affirmatively
opt out of the pension plan rather than to affirmatively opt in.49 Current-
ly, employees have to affirmatively opt in to an employer's pension plan.
The Obama Tax Plan doesn't address the detail of how the employee's
money will be invested, but if there is a default rule that opts in em-
ployees, there can also be a default rule for investing based upon the age
and years left to retirement.
B. Refundable Credit for Mortgage Interest
The Obama Tax Plan includes a proposed refundable credit equal to
ten percent of a taxpayer's mortgage interest for a maximum credit of
$800 which will be indexed for inflation in later years.50 Current law
only allows a tax benefit for mortgage interest if the taxpayer itemizes
her deductions. 51 A significant percentage of low-income homeowners
cannot currently take advantage of the mortgage interest deduction be-
cause they don't itemize their deductions.
C. Making Work Pay
The Obama Tax Plan would create a new "Making Work Pay" cre-
dit to offset social security withholding on up to $8,100 of earnings.52 In
addition, Senator Obama proposed increasing the EITC in a variety of
ways, but for our purposes, I want to concentrate on just one, namely
increasing the credit for taxpayers with three or more children. Current
law does not increase the EITC for families with more than two children,
yet the middle class CTC increases for every child the taxpayer has. The
47. See LEN BURMAN, SURACHAI KHITATRAKUN, GREG LEISERSON, JEFF ROHALY, ERIC
TODER, & BOB WILLIAMS, TAX POLICY CENTER, AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE 2008
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' TAX PLANS: REVISED AUGUST 15, 2008 14-15, available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411749-updated-candidates.pdf.
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Brown, supra note 6.
52. See BURMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 14.
2009]
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Obama Tax Plan would attempt to ameliorate the different treatment by
providing a larger credit amount for families with three or more children.
IV. RACE, CLASS, AND THE OBAMA TAx PLAN
The Obama Tax Plan in the areas discussed will change for the bet-
ter the tax circumstances of low-income taxpayers regardless of race as
well as workers and homeowners of color. First, the mandatory opt in
rules for employer provided pensions should increase the number of low-
income workers and workers of color who currently do not participate in
pension plans. (Recall a majority of low-income workers and workers of
color do not participate in their employer provided pension plans.) Cur-
rently the Obama Tax plan is silent concerning what those amounts will
be invested in. Perhaps this proposal should be coupled with a default
investment strategy that is more aggressive for younger employees who
are a long way from retirement and less aggressive for older employees
who are nearing retirement.
Second, the refundable mortgage credit will provide assistance to
low-income homeowners who currently do not itemize. It will allow
low-income homeowners to receive tax benefits that they currently do
not receive that their middle- and upper-income counterparts currently do
receive. I haven't seen an analysis of the mortgage interest deduction by
race, so it is unclear whether middle- and upper-income homeowners of
color are more or less likely than their white counterparts to itemize de-
ductions.
Third, the expansion of the EITC for more than two children gets
the EITC closer to the CTC, but by no means on parity with the CTC.
Low-income families' ability to pay taxes is reduced for each additional
child the same way middle-income families' ability to pay taxes is re-
duced for each additional child. The legislative history of the CTC clear-
ly recognized this for middle-income families, and the legislative history
of the E1TC clearly denied this benefit to low-income families. The Ob-
ama Tax Plan is a good first step.
V. CAUTIONARY TALE
I see two areas of potential political problems in the three proposals
discussed herein, leaving aside the dire economic circumstances we find
ourselves in, which have the potential to override everything discussed in
this Essay. The first is the impact which the default opt in rule will have
on employer decision making. The second is how the Republicans will
portray the numerous refundable credit proposals in the Obama Tax Plan.
[Vol. 86.SI
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Recently, General Motors announced that it was temporarily sus-
pending its employer match for its pension plans.53 Generally as an in-
centive to participate in an employer's pension plan, employers will
match employee contributions to a certain extent. It of course costs em-
ployers' money, but it is a way to recruit highly skilled labor, and since
many employees don't opt in, the "benefit" can be largely illusory. Be-
havioral economics literature suggests that more employees will partici-
pate as a result of an opt in default rule which means employer matches
will cost more-an amount many employers may be unwilling to pro-
vide. It is possible therefore that many more employers than General
Motors will suspend or eliminate their employer match which will hurt
all employees.54 It will hurt the low-income employees more, because
they won't have the financial wherewithal to invest more of their money
to compensate for the lack of an employer match, or invest their money
outside of the workplace. Default opt in rules will have to be carefully
calibrated given these tough economic times. That said, it is the right
proposal if you are concerned about increasing retirement security for all
Americans. Given the serious strains upcoming on social security as a
baby boomer generation prepares to retire, employer provided pensions
will play a key role in the financial security of millions of Americans.
Finally, refundable credits, like the EITC, have been referred to by
Republican members of Congress as "welfare. 55 Consider the following
excerpt which describes why Republican members of Congress decided
not to make the CTC fully refundable to EITC taxpayers:
Congressman Robert Ehrlich (R-Md.) observed that "[a]ll working
Americans with kids deserve a tax break. Middle-income workers
should not be responsible for subsidizing the payroll taxes paid by
low-income workers." Congressman Jack Kingston (R-Ga.) stated
that making the CTC refundable to low-income taxpayers would be
giving "another welfare benefit to people who are not paying taxes."
He continued by observing that there are "11 million middle-class
children whose parents desperately need tax relief for education
needs, for medical needs, for shelter, for food ... ." Then Speaker
Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) stated that giving "an additional $500-per-
child tax credit to those who pay no taxes is welfare, plain and sim-
ple." Congressman Bill Archer (R-Tex.) stated that the Democratic
proposal which would make the CTC refundable "takes money away
from middle-income parents who pay income taxes and gives it to
people who do not pay income taxes or who already receive a large
53. See, e.g., Emily Brandon, Will Your Employer Eliminate Its 401(k) Match?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 3, 2008 ("General Motors employees saving for retirement will no longer receive
a match for retirement dollars tucked into their 401(k)'s.").
54. Id. ("Charles Schwab, CMS Energy, El Paso Corp., Ford Motor Co., Great Northern
Paper, Lear, Prudential Securities, Tech Data Corp., and Textron Inc. are just a few of the companies
that suspended their 401(k) matches during the 2001 to 2003 bear market, but many of the compa-
nies restored the benefits later.").
55. Tax Treatment, supra note 4, at 791-92.
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check from the Government." Congressman Archer also was re-
ported to have said that extending the CTC to low-income working
families would amount to "a welfare payment." 
56
We have seen similar talk during the recent presidential campaign.57
The Obama Tax Plan will have to be sold to the public in a way to
humanize the working poor. I have argued that given the misconception
about who receives the EITC, racial stereotypes will have to be ad-
dressed. The working poor work every day, pay federal income taxes,
social security taxes, and other taxes and do not receive welfare pay-
ments. They are receiving income to offset the taxes that they're already
paying. Republicans will once again try to sell to the public the notion
that these are lazy welfare cheats, waiting at home for their government
checks. The Obama Administration will have to be vigilant in "selling"
its proposals for low-income taxpayers to the American public. A series
of commercials that displayed predominantly white, EITC claimants-
such as single mothers, single fathers, married couples, and the struggles
they face and how the EITC refunds have helped in the past-would be a
good place to start.58
The mortgage interest credit, which is also refundable, will similarly
be fodder for the "welfare" label. However, the question that remains to
be seen is whether it will be as easy for Republicans to paint homeown-
ers as "welfare" recipients the way it has been with low-income taxpay-
ers. Homeownership is so closely tied to the American Dream, and an
asset owned overwhelmingly by whites, that it is more likely than not,
that a refundable credit for homeowners, may escape the "welfare" name
calling. This may be especially true now, where homeowners generally
are currently viewed through a sympathetic lens.
CONCLUSION
The Bush tax cuts are set to expire in 2010. As a result, tax reform
within the next year or more is very likely. If the portions of the Obama
Tax Plan discussed herein actually become law, the tax situations of low-
income taxpayers as well as taxpayers of color will improve and the tax
situations of middle- and upper-income white taxpayers will not be
harmed. This is an exciting time to be a tax law professor!
56. Id. at 784-85 (citations omitted).
57. Gingrich and Ferara, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
58. Cf. DREW WESTEN, THE POLrICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE
FATE OF THE NATION 234 (2007) ("If we activate most Americans' networks about fairness, equali-
ty, and playing by the rules-and lead them to evaluate racially charged issues consciously in the
context of those values-they will support measures that level the playing field, even if it costs them
a little.").
[Vol. 86.S1
